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ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.

Gen. Stat. (Colorado), § 3630 providesithat, in addition to
his commission, an executor shall receive "such additional
allowances for costs and charges in collecting and
Executor
Acting as
Own Law'er,

defending the claims of the estate and disposing
of the same as shall be reasonable." Under this

Charges
statute it was held by the Supreme Court of Colowhile
an executor is entitled to a reasonable counrado that,
sel fee, yet where he, being a lawyer, acts as his own counsel, he
is not entitled to an extra allowance on this account, since, "to
allow him to become his own client, and charge for professional services for his own case, although in a representative
or trust capacity, would be holding out inducements for professional men to seek such representative places to increase
their professional business, which would lead to the most pernicious results": Doss v. Stevens, 59 Pac. 67.
In Burpee v. Townsend, 61 N. Y. Suppl. 467, the Supreme
Court of New York decided that the parties to an action have
Withdrawal the right to settle and discontinue, even though
by Client
the effect of such discontinuance is to deprive one
of the attorneys of his lien. This question has been decided
variously. As Gaynor, J., said, the authorities are "a bundle
of confusion."
BONDS.

Following the rules now firmly established in the federal
jurisdiction, the Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
Estoppel by (Caldwell, J., dissenting), held that where suit is
Recitals
brought upon county bonds, issued to refund
judgments obtained against the county, (I) the judgments are
res judicata, not only of every matter actually decided, but
of every matter which might have been decided in the former
actions, and (2) that the recitals in the bonds of the existence
of the judgments estop the county from alleging, as against
bona fide holders for value that the judgments do not exist:

Geer v. Board of Com'rs of Ouray, 97 Fed. 435.
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But the rules above stated apply only to bonds and not to
warrants upon the treasurers of municipal corporations for
rfunicipal
the payment of money. Such warrants, while
Warrants, transferable by indorsement and delivery, are not
impeachment negotiable instruments under the law merchants,
and recitals contained in them do not estop the municipality
from alleging the falsity of the recitals and the invalidity of
the warrants, even when they are in the hands of indorsees
for value: Watson v. City of Huron, 97 Fed. (Circ. Ct. of App.,
8th Circ.) 449.
CARRIERS.

In The Humboldt, 97 Fed. (D. C., D. Wash.) 656, the plaintiff, a passenger for some days on board a steamship owned by
the defendant, deposited his valise in his stateLiability of
steamship
room, from which it was stolen. Although unCompany for able to prove negligence on the part of the
Baggage
defendant, the plaintiff contended that the latter
occupied toward him the position of an inn-keeper toward his
guest. Hanford, J., following the weight of modem authority,
decided that the steamship company was not an inn-keeper,
but only a common carrier, and therefore was not liable, since
the baggage had not been entrusted to its custody and care.
Following the doctrine announced by the Supreme Court of
the United States, that a contract between a state and a corporation, exempting the latter from taxation, must
Railroad
Right to
be limited in its effect to the immediate parties
Regulate
thereto, the Circuit Court (E. D., N. C.) has deCharges.
cided that where a state has granted to a railroad
the privilege of established rates, such privilege, even if a
contract between the state and the railroad, does not pass
under a foreclosure sale pf all the "franchises, rights, privileges and immunities" of'the railroad to its successor: Mattlhews v. Corp. Board of Corn'rs, 97 Fed. 400.
CONFLICT OF LAWS.

In Blethen v. Bonner, 53 S. W. ioi6, the plaintift claimed
that the Texas courts should presume that the common law
Presumption existed in Massachusetts in z863, by virtue of
of Common Chap. 6, Art. 6, of the constitution of MassachuLaw in
setts of 1780, which provided that, "All the laws
Sister State which have heretofore been adopted, used or
approved in the province, colony or state of Massachusetts
Bay, and usually practiced in the courts of law, shall still
remain and be in full force until altered or repealed by the
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CONFLICT OF LAWS (Continued).

legislature." The Supreme Court of Texas, however, decided
that the above provision was not sufficient to rebut the presumption that the law of Massachusetts was similar to that of
Texas, in the absence of evidence to prove that the common
law of Massachusetts had not been altered by statute subsequent to 1780.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

The constitution of New York (Art. 9 § i) provides that,
"The legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free common schools wherein
Separate
Schoolsfor all the children of this state may be educated."
In People v. School Board,61 N. Y. Suppl. 330,
Colored
the Supreme Court of New York decided that
Children
this section was not infringed upon by a law providing for
separate schools for white and colored children (equal facilities
being given to each class of schools), nor did the law invade
any rights guaranteed by the amendments to the Constitution
of the United States.
Since the late decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States, the scope of Gelpcke v. Dubuque, I Wall. 175, has
become well settled. The latest addition to the
Decislonof
subject is Allen v. Allen, 97 Fed. 525, where the
CourtNot
Circuit Court of Appeals (Ninth Circuit) affirmed
a Law
the rule that the decision of the highest court of a state,
introducing a new construction of a state constitution, which
acts injuriously on previous contracts made on the faith of the
former construction, is not a "law" within the clause of the
Constitution of the United States forbidding any state to pass
a law impairing-the obligation of contracts.
CONTRACTS.

In Fresno Milling Co; v. Fresno Canal Co., 59 Pac. 141, the
defendant agreed to deliver water to the plaintiff through a
Impossibility certain canal, it being provided that the defendant
of Perform- should not be liable in case it was "lawfully or
a--forcibly restrained from such delivery." The
the -canal to become a public nuisance,
allowed
defendant
whereupon the canal commissioners filled it up and secured
an injunction restraining defendant from attempting to operate
it. In an action for failure to supply the water, the Supreme
Court of California held that the facts prerented an impossibilitas rei, as opposed to an impossibilitasfacti, and that
defendant was excused from performance.
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In Carperv. Sweet, 59 Pac. 45, it appeared that plaintiff, the
broker of defendant, negotiated with a customer for the sale
of defendant's property, but the sale was not conRival
Brokers,
summated. Subsequently another broker, emCommissions ployed by the defendant, sold the same property
to the same customer. The plaintiff contended that he was
entitled to his commission since the property was sold to the
purchaser with whom he had negotiated, but the Supreme
Court of Colorado decided that the case fell within the rule
that where a principal has openly placed his property in the
hands of different agents for the sale, he may pay the commissions to the one who produces the purchaser, and be
relieved from liability to the others.
A statute of Colorado (1883, § 3121) provides that any
instrument of writing to which the maker shall affix a scroll
by way of seal shall be of the same effect as if
Requits
the same were sealed. It was held that the
of Seal
printed word "seal," under the recital "sealed
with our seals," was sufficient to satisfy the requisites of the
statute, without the necessity of the maker actually placing
any seal or scroll thereon: Carlile v. People, 59 Pac. (Colo.) 48.
In an action to recover for negligence the defendant set up
a written release by the plaintiff The latter contended that it
was expressly stipulated as part of the consideraRelease,
Falureof tion for the release that the defendant should give
Consideration the plaintiff employment when he recovered from
the effect of the accident, and that the defendant had failed to
do so. Held, that in the absence of fraud by the defendant at
the time of the execution of the release, the mere fact that
defendant did not keep his promise subsequently, afforded no
reason for setting the release aside: Szymanski v. Chapman,
61 N. Y. Suppl. (Sup. Ct.) 310.
EVIDENCE.

On an indictment for larceny the prosecuting witness testifled that at the time of the occurrence he felt the
Res Geta
defendant's hand in his pocket and called out to the
bystanders, "They are robbing me." Held,that the exclamation of the witness was admissible as part of the res gestae:
People v. Piggott,59 Pac. (Cal.) 31.
Stewart v. St. Paul Rwy. Co., 8o N. W. 855, suggests a
reasonable limitation to the rule admitting photographs in
Photograps evidence. In that case, which was an action for
as Evldence negligence, the question at issue was the distance
of mlstnc
of a hole in a street from a point at which a street
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car stopped. The defendant proved that, some months after
the accident, the same car was moved to the exact place where
it had stood, a crowbar was inserted where the hole had
formerly been (afterwards filled up), and a photograph of the
scene was taken. The Supreme Court of Minnesota held that
the offerof a photograph in evidence was properly rejected, on
the ground that the question of distance was a mere mathematical problem, to be solved by measurement, and that the
photograph would probably only confuse the minds of the
jury on that point, since photographs are very misleading as
to distances, relative size or location of objects.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

Following the construction given by the Pennsylvania
courts to the Married Women's Property Act of 1848, the
Torts of
Supreme Court of Missouri has held that the MisWife
souri Act of 1889 (Rev. Stat. 6864), providing
that married women should be asfemes sole in respect to their
property, was not sufficient to abrogate the common law rule
in regard to a husband's liability for the torts of his wife:
Taylor v. Pullen, 53 S. W. io86.
Scherer v. Scherer, 55 N. E.
scrutiny which courts apply to
Contract of between husband and
support, brought smit against
Consideration

494, illustrates the close
all contracts of separation
wife. In that case the wife
her husband on the latter's

contract to support her, the contract reciting that

the parties were living apart, "by reason of the abandonment
one of the other." The Appellate Court of Indiana decided
*(i) that if the abandonment of the husband had taken place
for a cause not justified by law, the contract of support would
be without consideration and void, and (2) that in the absence
of proof by the wife that she had left her husband for legal
cause, there could be n recovery.
INSURANCE.

Where a fire irisurance policy provides that proof of loss
shall be furnished to the company "forthwith," the time is not
Proof of Loss, limited to the same extent as it would be under a
,, Forthwith" similar provision in regard to notice of loss. Thus
in Rines v. German Ins. Co., 8o N. W. 839, the Supreme
Court of Minnesota held that a proof of loss sent eighteen
days after the fire and received by the company twenty-one
days alter the fire satisfied the above clause, while intimating
that the same might not be true of a notice of loss.
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LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.

The charter of a railroad, granted in 1865, provided that
where the line should be constructed through the land of any
Duty of Rail-

person, it should be the duty of the railroad to

construct suitable crossings, whereby access to
the different portions of the land might be made
easy, upon failure to do which, the railroad should
be liable in damages. In Louisville & N. R. Ca. v. t'tman,
53 S. W. io4O, the railroad claimed that as its line had been
constructed through plaintiff's land for thirty years prior to
the action, its liability was barred by the statute of limitations.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky decided that the duty of
the railroad was a continuous one, therefore the right of
action was not barred.
road to Construct a
Crossing

MASTER AND SERVANT.

It is impossible to formulate any absolute rule defining
exactly the limits of the duty of a master to furnish safe
appliances for his servants, but each case must be
Equipment decided on its peculiar facts. In Blakely .M11 Co.
of Car, Side

v. Garrett,97 Fed. 537, the plaintiff, a workman,
on a freight train, was injured through the breaking of the wooden supports which, fitted in iron sockets, held
the load in place on a flat gondola car. A fellow servant had
selected the supports from wood supplied by the defendant,
and it was contended that the accident resulted from his
negligence in not using sufficient care in the selection, but the
Circuit Court of Appeals (Ninth Circuit) decided that the
defendant was under the absolute duty of furnishing wood of
an adequate quality, and it could not delegate the duty of
making the selection to a servant.
Supports

NEGLIGENCE.

Where premises are leased in an unsafe condition and the
lessee could, by the exercise of ordinary diligence, discover
this condition, and where the lessor has not enLeased
Premises, deavored to conceal the defect from the lessee, the
Unsafe
lessee, and not the lessor is liable to a third person
Condiion
for injuries received by reason of such defect:
Schwalback v. Sinkle, 97 Fed. (C. C. A., Ninth Circuit) 483.
But it was said in this case that if the lessor were liable at all,
he and the lessee would be liable jointly; therefore, it was
held that the complaint in an action against the lessor and
lessee was not demurrable on the ground that it joined separate causes of action.
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QUASI-CONTRACTS.

Perhaps no legal text-book of a theoretical character has
been so universally recognized as expounding, in fact, almost
Services
creating, a new branch of the law, as that of ProfesRendered
sor Keener on Quasi-Contracts. The latest case in
Without
which the principles laid down in that excellent
Requesat
work were applied is Cleveland, etc., Rwy. Co. v.
Shriem, 55 N. E. 515. There it appeared that an attorney, of
his own motion, sued on behalf of a railroad to recover back
taxes which had been illegally collected from the railroad.
The latter received the taxes from the attorney, but refused to
pay him a fee, whereupon he brought an action against the
road, upon an implied assumpsit, to recover the value of his
services. After quoting several pages of Professor Keener's
work, the Appellate Court of Indiana held that as the attorney
had not been employed by the railroad, and there did not appear to be any reason why the railroad would have been compelled to employ him rather than any other attorney, the
services had been rendered officiously, and the mere fact that
the railroad had been benefited did not create any liability on
its part. " From the authorities cited [by Professor Keener],
we think it may fairly be deduced that one rendering services
for another, in which the interests of the public are not involved, may, when the benefit of such service is enjoyed, recover
the reasonable value of such service from the person who
receives the benefit, although services are rendered without
the knowledge of the beneficiary. But from the authorities
it is also clear that there must exist a necessity for the rendition of the services without entering into a contract, or there
must exist such circumstances as imply an obligation to pay
therefor. This view is in line with the proposition that one
may not force his services upon another, and that one has a
right to select his creditor."
WILLS.
Webster v. Lowe, 53 S. W. 1030, carries the rule of construction of ambiguous papers as wills to a ridiculous extent.
Teasentary In that case the paper offered for probate was a
character mere autobiography of a man's life. The only
of Paper
provision from which a testamentary intention
could possibly be deduced was the last sentence, reading: "I
have requested my executors to give a clear deed for the
property, after my death, to A." The Court of Appeals of
Kentucky held that this sentence operated as a will, although
to some minds it would clearly indicate that its writer did not
intend it as a conveyance, but was referring to some other instrument.

